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Model-Driven Safety Analysis of Closed-Loop
Medical Systems
Miroslav Pajic, Student Member, IEEE, Rahul Mangharam, Member, IEEE, Oleg Sokolsky, Member, IEEE,
David Arney, Julian Goldman, and Insup Lee, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract—In modern hospitals, patients are treated using a
wide array of medical devices that are increasingly interacting
with each other over the network, thus offering a perfect example
of a cyber-physical system. We study the safety of a medical
device system for the physiologic closed-loop control of drug
infusion. The main contribution of the paper is the verification
approach for the safety properties of closed-loop medical device
systems. We demonstrate, using a case study, that the approach
can be applied to a system of clinical importance. Our method
combines simulation-based analysis of a detailed model of the
system that contains continuous patient dynamics with model
checking of a more abstract timed automata model. We show
that the relationship between the two models preserves the crucial
aspect of the timing behavior that ensures the conservativeness
of the safety analysis. We also describe system design that can
provide open-loop safety under network failure.
Index Terms—closed-loop medical systems, model-based devel-
opment, safety analysis, high-confidence medical systems
I. INTRODUCTION
CLINICAL scenarios for critical care patients often in-volve large numbers of medical devices. Some of these
devices, such as bedside monitors, provide vital information
about the state of the patient. Other devices (e.g., infusion
pumps) provide treatment. That is, they affect the state of
the patient (e.g., by infusing medication). Medical device
systems, considered together with the patient and caregivers,
represent an important class of cyber-physical systems. Patient
safety is the primary concern in such systems, yet reasoning
about patient safety is very difficult because of insufficient
understanding of the dynamics of the human body’s response
to treatment. Human errors, another important source of pa-
tient safety problems, are also difficult to reason about in the
framework of conventional embedded system development.
It is natural to view a clinical scenario as a control system, in
which the patient is a plant, bedside monitors are sensors and
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infusion pumps are actuators. Traditionally, caregivers perform
the role of the controller in such a system. This means that
the caregiver needs to continuously monitor all sensor devices
and apply appropriate treatment. The large number of devices
to monitor and control makes the job of the caregiver very
difficult. On top of that, a caregiver is typically responsible
for several patients. An emergency may divert the caregiver’s
attention elsewhere, making him or her miss an important
event. As a result, patient safety may suffer. Multiple such
occurrences are documented in the clinical literature.
The human caregiver will always play an indispensable part
of most clinical scenarios. However, in many cases automatic
controllers can play important roles, reducing the burden on
the caregiver and avoiding the possibility of human errors. A
number of such cases was documented in the ASTM standard
for the Integrated Clinical Environment [2], developed by
the Medical Device Plug-and-Play Interoperability program
(mdpnp.org) [3]. Although many medical devices today have
network interfaces and can send sensed data across the net-
work, few can be controlled remotely. Vendors of medical
equipment continue to stay away from closed-loop scenarios.
The rationale is that it is difficult to reason about patient
safety in closed-loop scenarios. Such reasoning is necessary
for medical devices, which have to be approved for use by
government regulators who assess their safety and effective-
ness. A particular challenge arises from the complexity of a
complex interplay between the continuous dynamics of the
patient reaction to treatment and the discrete nature of the
controller and communication network. The dynamics of the
patient body is not well understood and exhibits parametric
uncertainty and high variability between different patients.
To overcome this difficulty, we explore a model-driven
approach that allows us to prove safety properties of devices
on the modeling level and ensures that abstract models used
in the verification process are sound with respect to the actual
dynamics of the system. Both the abstract, formal model and
the detailed, informal model are needed in the process of
verification, validation, and regulatory approval of closed-loop
medical device systems. On the one hand, formal models
allow us to exhaustively explore the possible behaviors of the
system and prove its safety. On the other hand, detailed models
allow us to use high-fidelity simulation that take real system
dynamics into account. Both kinds of results can be used to
make the case for regulatory approval.
We start with a detailed model of the system in Simulink.
The model contains a patient model that reflects continuous
pharmacokinetic dynamics of drug absorption by the patient
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body. To reflect the variation between different patient popula-
tions, the patient model incorporates uncertainty in the values
of its parameters. The Simulink model enables high-fidelity
simulations of the system in various scenarios. Yet, currently
there are no tools supporting the verification of hybrid systems
(i.e., systems consisted of both discrete-time components and
continuous-time dynamics) modeled in Simulink that are both
nondeterministic and with uncertain parameters. Most existing
tools for Simulink are limited to testing-based analysis that
does not guarantee the coverage of parameter space.
To prove safety of the system, we express the safety property
as a timing relationship between system components. We then
model the system using the formalism of timed automata in
the UPPAAL tool [4].1 The model abstracts away continuous
dynamics of the system, replacing it with timing constraints.
The values for the timing constraints are obtained from the
continuous dynamics of system components using the detailed
Simulink model. It is necessary to guarantee that the patient
model in UPPAAL over-approximates the patient’s dynamics
with respect to the utilized control algorithm. For that, we
present a procedure that utilizes convex optimization to calcu-
late an upper bound on critical timing values for a linear time-
invariant (LTI) model with uncertain parameters and show that
behaviors of the UPPAAL model is always within this bound.
There is a need to develop a methodology for the analysis
of safety properties of closed-loop medical device systems [5],
[6]. In this paper we present a case-study focused on a system
of clinical importance. In the case study, we prove that the
system is safe under a set of assumptions. We then demonstrate
that a violation of these assumptions (e.g., by a more realistic
fault model) can make the system unsafe. Finally, we propose
a solution to restore system safety under the new fault model.
The approach presented in this paper is intended to serve as
a reference point, a step toward a model-based methodology
for safety analysis of closed-loop medical device systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the medical case study and presents the system
architecture. Section III explains the use of Simulink models
of the system to analyze safety with no failure assumption.
It also describes a procedure used to translate safety require-
ments into timing constraints, when the patient is modeled
as a continuous-time LTI system with uncertain parameters.
Section IV describes the system model in UPPAAL and safety
properties we verified. Section V proposes modifications to
the system to deal with failures and provides an argument that
the new system guarantees open-loop safety. The last section
summarizes the paper and identifies avenues for future work.
II. CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe a case study that represents one
of the MD PnP interoperability clinical scenarios [2]. In the
past, we built a demonstration of this scenario [7] using the
Integrated Clinical Environment (ICE) architecture, developed
by the MD PnP project. Figure 1 shows the main components
of an ICE-compliant system. The patient and caregiver are the
1Due to space constraints, we do not present the formal definition and
semantics of timed automata. These definitions can be obtained from [4].
Caregiver
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Fig. 1. MD PnP Architecture with Patient-in-the-Loop Automatic Control.
human elements of the system. The Supervisor is the computer
system that runs the control algorithm. Medical devices are
connected, through adapters where necessary, to the Network
Controller, which keeps track of connected devices and their
capabilities. The Data Logger records pertinent network traffic
for later forensic analysis and external networks such as the
hospital information system are connected through an external
interface. In our case study, we did not model the data logger
since it does not affect our runtime safety analysis.
A. Clinical Use Case
The selected scenario involves a patient connected to a
patient-controlled analgesia (PCA) infusion pump. PCA infu-
sion pumps are commonly used to deliver opioids for pain
management, for instance after surgery. Patients have very
different reactions to the medications and require very different
dosages and delivery schedules. PCA pumps give the patient a
button to press to request a dose when they decide they want it
rather than using a schedule fixed by a caregiver. Some patients
may decide they prefer a higher level of pain to the nausea
the drugs may cause and can press the button less often, while
patients who need a higher dose can press it more often.
A major problem with opioid medications in general is that
an excessive dose, or overdose, can cause respiratory failure.
A properly programmed PCA system should not allow an
overdose because it is programmed with limits on the number
of doses it will deliver, regardless of how often the button
is pushed. However, this safety mechanism is not sufficient to
protect all patients. Some patients still receive overdoses if the
pump is misprogrammed, if the pump programmer overesti-
mates the maximum dose a patient can receive, if the wrong
concentration of drug is loaded into the pump, or if someone
other than the patient presses the button (PCA-by-proxy),
among other causes. PCA pumps have been involved in a large
number of adverse events [8], and existing safeguards such as
drug libraries and programmable limits are not adequate to
address all the scenarios seen in clinical practice [9].
The system we are considering aims to improve patient
safety in such scenarios by introducing a supervisor that
monitors patient data for the early signs of respiratory failure
and can stop the infusion and sound an alarm if the patient
experiences an adverse event. We use a pulse oximeter device
that receives physiological signals from a clip on the patient’s
finger and processes them to calculate heart rate and SpO2
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Fig. 2. Hardware for the PCA Demo System.
outputs, where SpO2 is the measure of blood oxygenation.
Note that, at the time of writing, there are no PCA pumps on
the market that are capable of being remotely controlled. In
the demonstration system, we used the PCA pump prototype
we have built during the Generic Infusion Pump project [10].
B. System Architecture
Figure 2 shows the components of the PCA safety system.
The system components are described below. Figure 3 shows
the devices and essential data flow in this control loop. In the
case-study pulse oximeter acts as the Monitoring System from
Figure 2. It receives physiological signals from the patient and
processes them to produce heart rate and SpO2 outputs. The
Supervisor gets these outputs and makes a control decision,
possibly sending a stop signal to the PCA Pump. Unless it
is stopped by the Supervisor, the PCA pump delivers a drug
to the patient at its programmed rate that corresponds to the
selected operating mode. The patient model gets the drug rate
as an input and updates the drug level in the patient’s body.
This in turn influences the physiological output signals through
a drug absorption function.
1) PCA Infusion Pump: The PCA pump in the case study
operates in the following way. Before operation, the pump
is programmed by the caregiver, who sets the pump’s op-
erating mode, normal rate of infusion, the increased rate of
a bolus, and bolus duration. Some PCA pumps also can be
programmed to limit the total amount of drug to be infused.
Once programmed and started, the pump delivers the drug
at the normal rate until it is stopped or the bolus button is
pressed. From that moment, it delivers drug at the bolus rate
for the specified duration and then returns to the normal rate.
The pump is equipped with a number of built-in sensors that
detect internal malfunctions such as the presence of air in the
tubes that deliver the drug. When a problem is detected, the
pump is stopped. We do not consider such malfunctions in this
case study and do not represent the built-in alarm mechanism.
Finally, the pump is equipped with a network interface,
which allows the pump to transmit its status across the network
to other devices such as the logger. For the purpose of our
scenario, we assume that the network interface allows the
pump to accept control signals. A stop control signal will set
the current infusion rate to zero, while the start signal will set
the normal infusion rate (regardless of the state of the pump
before it was stopped).
2) Monitoring System: Patients using a PCA pump are
usually also attached to patient monitors that record the pa-
tient’s EKG, blood pressure, respiratory rate, and SpO2. These
last output value 97 - 100 94 - 96 90 - 93 85 - 89 < 85
new window size 10 8 7 6 4
TABLE I
SLIDING WINDOW SIZE FOR PULSE OXIMETER
monitors sound alarms if the measured values are outside
thresholds set by the caregivers, but do not stop the infusion.
Thus, the patient continues to receive more of an overdose
while the caregiver responds, assesses the patient, and if a
real problem occurred, finally stops the pump.
In this study, we look at using SpO2 and heart rate measure-
ments as the basis for a physiologic closed-loop control system
that can stop the PCA pump and halt the dose of opioid while
sounding an alarm if respiratory distress is detected. Both of
these measurements can be produced by a device called Pulse
Oximeter. This device is equipped with a finger clip sensor that
shines two wavelengths of light through the patient’s finger.
The measured light intensity reflects the blood oxygen content,
which can change rapidly.
The pulse oximeter samples the patient’s SpO2 at regular
intervals, processes them, and outputs an averaged result [11].
It calculates the average using a variable-sized sliding window.
The window size varies with the last output value. The reason
for changing the window size is that a smaller sample size
gives faster, but potentially less accurate results. When SpO2
values are low, quick response is more important than filtering
out transient noise. When SpO2 is high, increasing the window
size helps to filter out transient low values at the expense of
less frequent updates. Since the samples are at regular intervals
and a varying number of samples are used to calculate the
output, the output is updated irregularly. The size of the sliding
window used in the case study is determined using a simple
table shown in Table I. Note that this table does not reflect
the details of any real implementation but rather attempts to
capture the essential behavior of a typical pulse oximeter.
3) Caregiver Model: The caregiver in this system programs
the PCA pump and reacts to alarms. The control system is
closed loop, so no intervention by the caregiver is necessary
to stop the infusion when a problem is detected. The caregiver
can react to restart the system if it has stopped in reaction to
a false alarm, or when a problem such as a slipped patient
sensor is fixed.
Signal Processing 
Time
Pulse Oximeter
Output 
Physiological 
Signals
Drug Level
Patient Model
Drug Absorption 
Function
SpO2 & HR 
Levels
Algorithm 
Processing Time
Supervisor
Pump 
Commands
PCA Pump
Pump Processing 
TimeDrug Infusion
Drug Request
Fig. 3. PCA System Control Loop.
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4) Patient Model: To model the Patient we use a pharma-
cokinetic patient model for intravenous delivery of anesthetic
drugs presented in [12] (module 12). The model utilizes a
common 3-compartment model to describe the changes in drug
concentration in blood and tissue. The patient is described as a
continuous-time LTI system with a state space representation:C˙1C˙2
C˙3
 =
−(k12 + k13 + k10) k21 k31k12 −k12 0
k13 0 −k31

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
C1C2
C3
+
 1V10
0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
I
dl =
[
1 0 0
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
C1C2
C3
 (1)
where Ci, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the drug concentration in the ith
compartment, I is the mass infusion rate (in mass/unit of
time) of the drug, kij are patient specific constants and V1
is the volume of the blood plasma compartment. Since the
first compartment presents blood plasma, its concentration is
mapped into the drug level concentration dl as in (1).
Using the above model, we represent the instantaneous level
of medication in the patient’s body as a single variable dl. This
variable is linked to the patient’s heart rate and SpO2 level by
the drug absorption function, which represents how the patient
reacts to the dose received over time. Using dl value, the state
space of the patient is partitioned into three regions: in pain
(under-medicated), pain-controlled (adequate medication), or
over-medicated. These regions are defined as (Figure 4):
• The Safe region is defined as the region where the Patient’s
readings are below some predefined threshold values that
guarantee that Patient’s vitals are not endangered.
• If the patient is over-medicated to the point that he or
she starts experiencing respiratory distress, we consider it an
overdose. Thus, we define the Critical region where Patient’s
life is in danger or there is a chance that irreparable damage
can occur. The overdose condition is referred as the border of
the Critical region.
• The Alarming region defined as the region where Patient’s
vitals are not endangered but there is a reasonable concern
that the Patient can be forced to the Critical region.
Any treatment needs to make sure that the patient stays out
of the critical region, and we use this requirement as the main
safety property of the system that needs to be ensured. In this
case study, since the drug level is estimated from the patient’s
SpO2 and heart rate, we defined the boundary of the Critical
region in terms of these values and set it to HSpO22 = 70%
for SpO2 (and HHR2 = 11.5 beats/min for heart rate), a clear
indication of respiratory failure.
Some patients react very quickly to a drug dose, while others
Fig. 4. Regions of Patient’s conditions.
react more slowly. Furthermore, a mapping between the drug
level on one side and measured SpO2 level and heart rate is
also patient specific. Therefore, by adjusting this function, we
can tune the model to different patient types. However, in all
these cases patient reaction to drug can be described as in (1),
where patient specific coefficients belong to predefined regions
and fully determine the patient’s behavior.
To analyze the dynamics of the patient’s pharmacokinetic
model, we have designed the system model in Simulink (the
model is described in next section). This enables simulation
and analysis of the system’s behavior under different scenarios.
5) Supervisor: The supervisor is a running program in the
system that communicates with other devices and executes
clinical application scripts (CAS’s). A CAS is a script that
implements a particular clinical use case. The clinical ap-
plication in this case study is to control the loop shown in
Figure 3. The Supervisor receives the patient’s heart rate and
SpO2 measurements from the pulse oximeter and uses this
information to decide whether the PCA infusion pump should
be allowed to run or immediately stopped.
In the case study, two simple Supervisor’s control algo-
rithms were designed. In the first algorithm, after the pump
is activated the decision to stop the pump is made as soon
as the patient heart rate or SpO2 readings fall below a fixed
threshold. The threshold value needs to ensure that the patient
does not enter the Critical region despite the delay in detecting
the problem and delivering the control signal to the pump. For
the case study, we defined the threshold as HSpO21 = 90% for
the SpO2 and HHR1 = 57 beats/min for heart rate. Values
below these thresholds typically indicate “a clinical concern”
([13], p. 45), meaning that a caregiver needs to be notified. The
supervisor notifies the caregiver when the threshold is crossed,
as it sends the message to stop the pump. Values between H1
and H2 are thus referred as the Alarming region. The width
of the alarming region is denoted as ∆H =| H2 −H1 |.
The second control algorithm is similar, with a small
difference that in this case the pump is always activated for a
fixed, predefined duration of time. Therefore, the Supervisor
does not need to send commands to stop the pump unless, as
in the first design, it detects that the Patient have entered the
Alarming region. In this case, the Supervisor again sends a
command to stop the pump and alerts the caregiver.
III. MODELING SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN SIMULINK
The overall structure of the Simulink model follows that of
the model shown in Figure 2. The Simulink blocks are used
to capture the dynamics of the PCA infusion pump, Pulse
Oximeter (PO), Patient model, and Supervisor, described in
Section II. In addition, they are used to define the notion of
the safe, critical, and alarming regions precisely. Using the
overall structures and timing properties of the components,
this section describes when the system is safe and when it is
not safe. Finally, it identifies the limitations of the model with
respect to its use in system verification.
A. Simulink Models
The PO is implemented as described in Section II (a
more detailed description of the PO design is presented in
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Section IV). It monitors the Patient’s HR and SpO2 level and
informs the Supervisor about these values. Figure 5 presents
the Patient’s model, where effects of the drug flow are depicted
using the Patient model described in Section II. Therefore, the
Patient is modeled as a continuous-time LTI system where
matrices A,B and C are defined as in (1). For the Patient
model that describes a particular population of subjects, we
use the parameters for a scenario of intravenous delivery of
anesthetic drugs ([12], page 694). Here, the kinetic values
in (1) are initialized as:
kˆ10 = 0.152 min−1, kˆ12 = 0.207 min−1, kˆ13 = 0.040 min−1
kˆ21 = 0.092 min−1, kˆ31 = 0.048 min−1, Vˆ1 = 12 liters. (2)
In the general case, to be able to express Patient dynamics for
different types of patient populations, it is not possible to fix
a value for each of the parameters kij . Therefore, to model
the Patient’s dynamics in the general case, each parameter kij
is initialized with a value within a closed region:
kij ∈
[
kˆij −∆kij , kˆij + ∆kij
]
(3)
V1 ∈
[
Vˆ1 −∆V, Vˆ1 + ∆V
]
,
which is a simplified version of the function presented in [14].
This effectively means that matrices A and B, defined in (1),
in the general case (i.e., for all types of patients) belong to a
specific polyhedron. The patient’s Heart Rate (HR) and SpO2
level are extracted from its drug level using a linear mapping,
as shown in Figure 5. As the mapping between the drug level,
measured SpO2 level and heart rate is patient-specific, it is
necessary to include this additional level of uncertainty into
the model. Therefore, in the implemented model, the gain in
matrix C (i.e., element C11) can also take values within a
pre-specified region [1−∆c, 1 + ∆c].
To analyze the patient’s dynamics for parameter values
from (2), the patient’s behavior was simulated for a case when
the drug is repeatedly delivered for one hour followed by one
hour pause. Figure 6 presents the obtained changes in HR and
SpO2 levels during the period of almost three hours.
B. Analysis of System Safety Properties
For the aforementioned system we consider the safety
requirement that the PCA pump will always be stopped before
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Patient’s Critical region is reached. Since the Supervisor can
be configured to operate in two different modes, depending
on the Supervisor’s mode the safety requirement could be
translated into different conditions imposed on the system.
Therefore, in this section the safety requirement is analyzed
separately for both Supervisor modes.
1) Safety conditions for the first Supervisor design: In
the first supervisor’s design, patient’s requests automatically
activate the drug flow. The Supervisor is implemented to stop
the PCA pump only if the Patient reaches the Alarming region.
Otherwise, while the Patient is in the Safe region, the pump
provides continuous drug flow to the patient. We note that
the safety requirement (that the Patient never enters into the
Critical region) is satisfied if the following condition is met:
tPOdel + tnet + tSup + tnet + tPump + tPCA2P ≤ tcrit (4)
where:
• tPOdel - worst case delay caused by the PO; it can be
calculated from the PO specification, see Table I,
• tnet - worst case network delay; the value depends on the
used network protocol,
• tSup - worst case delay introduced by the Supervisor; it
can be obtained from the Supervisor model,
• tPump - worst case delay introduced by the PCA pump;
the value can be derived from the pump model,
• tPCA2P - worst case delay between the moment the drug
flow is activated and the moment when it reaches the
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS 6
patient; it depends on the type of used connection,
• tcrit - Patient’s critical time, a shortest time that the
patient spends in the Alarming region before entering the
Critical region; it can be computed from the patient’s
model.
If (4) is satisfied, we can guaranteed that the Supervisor
will be able to determine that the patient has entered the
Alarming zone and stop the PCA pump before the patient
switches from the Alarming to Critical zone. The values for
these time constants are shown in Table II. All values, beside
tnet, can be obtained from the system specification. Here, for
safety analysis we assume that the network latency tnet is
bounded by 0.5s and we will try to relax the bound later.
Remark 1: Currently there exist several Simulink-based
network simulators that can be used for network modeling
(e.g., TrueTime). However, from the perspective of safety anal-
ysis and relation (4), the network can be modeled as a random
delay with delay distribution that matches the application sce-
nario. It is worth noting here that the network induced delay is
not fixed and it depends on the underlying network controller
(e.g., 802.11 MAC with distributed (DCF) or point (PCF)
coordination function) and environmental conditions (e.g.,
traffic, presence of interference). Also, although implemented
network protocols can improve the overall Quality of Service,
in the general case the delay can not be bounded when wireless
networks are used, no matter which communication protocol is
employed. Hence, even though we start with the assumption
on bounded network delay, we also consider scenarios with
unbounded network delays (i.e., messages can be lost), along
with its consequences on the system’s safety.
The main problem in determining whether the safety condi-
tion is satisfied is to find the value for tcrit. If a mathematical
model for the patient is known, and patient-specific (fixed)
parameters can be obtained, this value can be analytically or
numerically determined. In our model, for a specific popula-
tion of subjects we can use fixed parameters as in (2). Since
the Patient is modeled as an LTI process when the drug flow
is on, time-responses for drug level, HR and SpO2 level have
the same general form:
cmin + a1e
−λ1t + a2e−λ2t + a3e−λet (5)
where λ1 = −0.0079, λ2 = −0.0023, λ3 = −0.0007
are eigenvalues of matrix A = Aˆ (from (2)) and constants
cmin, a1, a2 and a3 belong to different sets of constants
(depending whether we consider the drug level, HR or SpO2)
for a fixed drug infusion rate.
To calculate tcrit consider time instances, t1 and t2, when
the Patient enters the Alarming and Critical regions, respec-
tively. If the Patient is continuously pushed toward the Critical
region (which in this case means that the pump is continuously
delivering drug to the Patient), then tcrit = t2 − t1. Consid-
ering the Alarming region boundary for SpO2 it holds that:
time delay tPOdel tnet tSup tPump tPCA2P
value 1s 0.5s 0.2s 0.1s 2s
TABLE II
WORST-CASE DELAYS
HSpO2i = c
SpO2
min + a
SpO2
1 e
−λ1ti + aSpO22 e
−λ2ti + aSpO23 e
−λeti .
Thus, we can compute tcrit from H
SpO2
1 −HSpO22 = ∆HSpO2 .
For our model the Patient’s dynamics is dominated by the
maximal eigenvalue λ3, which is approximately −0.0007s−1,
but the other eigenvalues also have some impact. Thus, tcrit
is a couple of orders of magnitude bigger than the sum of
all other timing parameters from (4). For HSpO21 = 90% and
HSpO22 = 70% we have tcrit ≈ 581.2 s ≈ 9.68 min. Therefore,
for these patient parameters that correspond to a particular
population, our system always satisfies the safety requirement
if the assumption that all messages are delivered is valid.
2) Safety analysis for the model with uncertain parameters:
The aforementioned procedure for tcrit calculation can be used
only when exact values for the parameters in matrices A, B
and C are known. As specified earlier in the section, in the
general case we can only claim that matrices A, B and C
belong to polyhedrons <{A}, <{B} and <{C}, respectively.
For example, a polyhedron <{A} can be defined as:
<{A} = {A| −∆A  A− Aˆ  ∆A} (6)
where  denotes element-wise inequality and for all ∆kij
from (3) the matrix ∆A is defined as
∆A =
−(∆k12 + ∆k13 + ∆k10) ∆k21 ∆k31∆k12 −∆k12 0
∆k13 0 −∆k31
 .
Polyhedrons <{B} and <{C} can be similarly defined.
To model different types of patient populations, in the
Patient model each of the predefined parameters can vary
up to 10% from its initial value (e.g., ∆k12 = 0.1k12).2 In
this case, to check the safety condition from (4) it is not
possible to use the time response from (5) since matrices A, B
and C are unknown. To deal with this type of uncertainty,
when matrices belong to a predefined set of polyhedrons, the
following theorem can be utilized:
Theorem 1: Consider an LTI system with uncertain param-
eters of the form:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (7)
y(t) = Cx(t).
where A ∈ <{A}, B ∈ <{B} and C ∈ <{C}. If a constant
input vector ui is connected to the system’s input at time t0
and x0 = x(t0), then for all t ≥ 0:
t ≥ 1||A˜|| ln
 |y(t0 + t)− y(t0)|
||C˜|| · (||x0||+ ||B˜ui||||Amin|| )
+ 1
 (8)
where:
A˜ = argmax
A∈ <{A}
||A||, B˜ = argmax
B∈ <{B}
||Bui||, C˜ = argmax
C∈ <{C}
||C||
(9)
Amin = argmin
A∈ <{A}
||A|| (10)
2Although we can not guarantee that the uncertainty bound (i.e., 10%) can
be used to model all types of uncertainties in the patient model, we have opted
to use it as it provides a way to model different types of patients. However, if
the patient’s dynamics (pharmacokinetics) is better understood for particular
types of patient populations, a new uncertainty bound can be easily adopted.
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Proof: See Appendix A
If x0 = x(t0) is known, the bound for tcrit can be computed
as shown in (8). However, in cases where only values y(t0)
and y(t0 + t) are known it is not possible to exactly determine
x0, since y(t0) = Cx0 and matrix C might not be invertible
(as in our case). In this case, to compute a lower bound t˜crit
we consider a vector norm ||x˜0|| that is an upper bound on
the maximal norm vector x can take. To obtain this value we
simulated the patient’s dynamics when the patient parameters
are initialized as A = A˜ and B = B˜ (from (9)), since this
configuration at each time instance maximizes the value for
||x˙|| from (1). Note that the proposed bound on ||x0|| is very
conservative as it provides an upper bound on ||x(t)|| in the
general case (i.e., for the reachable domain) and not only in
points where y(t0) = Cx0. However, as we will see later, even
with this bound system safety can be guaranteed.
When the pump is continuously delivering the drug, a lower
bound for tcrit (i.e., t˜crit) can be derived using Theorem 1.
In this case, the safety conditions will be satisfied if:
tPOdel + tnet + tSup + tnet + tPump + tPCA2P ≤ t˜crit (11)
where:
t˜crit =
1
||A˜|| ln
 |∆H
SpO2 |
SpO2gain
||C˜|| ·
(
||x˜0||+ ||B˜ui||||Amax||
) + 1
 (12)
and SpO2gain = 0.35 · 5.8 = 2.03 is the gain from the linear
mapping between the drug level and SpO2 level (Figure 5).
The value for ||A˜min|| can be efficiently obtained from the
convex optimization problem, using existing methods/tools for
convex optimization. We used CVX, a package for specifying
and solving convex programs [15], to solve this optimization
problem for the predefined region <{A}, and obtained the
value ||A˜|| = 7.34 ·10−3. On the other hand, it is not possible
to utilize efficient methods for convex optimization to obtain
||A˜||, ||B˜ui|| and ||C˜||, because Amax, B, C are arguments
in maximization over convex functions. However, to compute
these values the following theorem can be employed:
Theorem 2: Consider the optimization problem:
maxA∈ <{A} ||A||, where <{A} is defined as in (6).3
Then, there exists an optimal solution Amax which is a
vertex of the polyhedron <{A}.
Proof: See Appendix B.
From the previous theorem, to compute ||A˜|| it is necessary
to calculate ||A|| in all 2n2 vertices of the polyhedron. In
our case, after computing the norm in 29 = 512 points, we
obtained ||A˜|| = 8.97 · 10−3. Similarly, after computing the
norm in 2 points for both ||Bui|| and ||C||, we obtained
||B˜ui|| = 0.0917, ||C˜|| = 1.100. Furthermore, after matrices
A˜, B˜, C˜ had been determined, using the previously described
approach we obtained the value ||x˜0|| = 27.08. Therefore, in
our model t˜crit = 24.83 s ≈ 0.41 min. Note that this bound is
significantly lower than tcrit calculated for the ‘fixed’ patient
model (which was 9.68 minutes). As mentioned before, this
bound can be improved if ||x˜0|| is calculated only at points
where Cx0 = y(t0). However, even with this conservative
3Note that matrix A does not have to be a square matrix.
bound, the value for tcrit satisfies the safety requirement if
communication delay imposed by the network is bounded.
Remark 2: The bound provided in (12) can be improved
using the approach presented in [16]. In addition, this approach
can be utilized in cases where a non-constant drug flow is
delivered to the patient. However, the flexibility comes with a
higher computational cost required by this procedure. Finally,
for complex Simulink patient models (e.g., nonlinear systems
with uncertain parameters or nondeterministic systems) it
might not be possible to analytically determine t˜crit. In this
case patient’s behavior can be simulated, and since simulation
results depend on input signals and the model’s initial state, it
is essential that the worst-case scenario is known. Otherwise,
methods similar to the one from [17] can be used.
3) Safety conditions for the second Supervisor design: As
described in Section II, for the second Supervisor design the
pump is configured to stay activated only for a predefined fixed
duration of time. In addition, Supervisor stops the pump only
if the patient is in the Alarming region. In this case, the safety
requirement is satisfied if at least one of the two conditions are
met. The first condition is described in (4) and it is equivalent
to the safety condition for the first Supervisor design. The
second safety requirement is that the PCA activation period
tdur (i.e., duration of the drug flow) satisfies the requirement
that it can not drive the Patient from the Safe region to the
Critical region. This condition can be specified as tdur ≤ tcrit.
Therefore, the second safety requirement is satisfied if:
tdur ≤ t˜crit, (13)
with t˜crit defined as in (12).
4) Limitations of system verification in Simulink: Currently
there does not exist a holistic approach for verification of
nondeterministic hybrid systems, with uncertain parameters,
modeled in Simulink. Most of the existing tools use procedures
like Instrumentation Based Verification [18] where monitors
are designed to check for violations of the safety conditions.
However, this approach employs coverage-based testing, and
thus can be used only in combination with tools for automatic
test generation. Several such commercial (e.g., Reactis, Design
Verifier) and non-commercial (e.g. [17]) tools exist, but they
do not guarantee full coverage of the design state-space.
From the safety conditions described in (4) and (13), we
infer that safety of the closed-loop system can be mapped into
analysis of timing relations between the system’s components.
Thus, we have opted to use UPPAAL [4] for verification
of the closed-loop system. UPPAAL also facilitates devel-
opment of more detailed system models since it inherently
supports composition of asynchronous components. However,
when UPPAAL is used for the system’s verification it is
necessary to guarantee that the patient model in UPPAAL
over-approximates the patient’s dynamics with respect to the
utilized control algorithm (as described in the next section).
IV. SYSTEM MODELING AND VERIFICATION IN UPPAAL
This section describes UPPAAL modeling of the closed-
loop system. The structure of the model follows the architec-
ture of the system. For each component in Figure 2, the model
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PCA
sampleready
Patient
Pulse 
Oximeter
samplebuffer
P2PCA_bolus
pca_rate
Caregiver
CG2PCA_program
S2NW_stop
CG2PCA_start
Supervisor
resultready_n
Network
CG2S_clear
S2NW_clear
po_result_n
po_resultresultready
NW2PCA_clearNW2PCA_stop
Fig. 7. Communication structure of the UPPAAL model.
RstoppedOD
BstoppedOD
bolusing
(bolus_clock <= default_bolus_time)
running
programmedon
NW2PCA_stop?
pca_rate:=0
P2PCA_bolus?
pca_rate := pca_rate + default_bolus_rate,
bolus_clock := 0
NW2PCA_stop?
(bolus_clock >= default_bolus_time) 
and (not time_mode)
pca_rate:= 0
NW2PCA_clear ?
NW2PCA_clear ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
P2PCA_bolus ?
NW2PCA_clear ?
pca_rate := default_rate(bolus_clock >= default_bolus_time) and time_modepca_rate := default_rate
NW2PCA_clear ?
pca_rate := default_rate
NW2PCA_stop ?
pca_rate := 0
CG2PCA_start ?
pca_rate := default_rate
CG2PCA_programmed ?
Fig. 8. Timed automaton for the PCA pump.
includes a separate automaton. The automata communicate
using synchronization channels and shared variables. Figure 7
shows the network of automata and communication between
them. Solid arrows represent communication channels, while
dashed arrows denote shared variables.
A. UPPAAL Component Models
1) PCA Automaton: The automaton, which models the
pump, is shown in Figure 8. When the pump is operational,
it is either in the state running, with the shared variable
pca_rate set to default rate, or in the state bolusing,
when pca_rate is increased by the bolus rate. Both rates
are specified as parameters of the model. Furthermore, by
setting the appropriate value for time mode the pump can
be set (at configuration, not runtime) to work in the both
previously mentioned modes. In the first mode the pump is
kept continuously on (i.e., in bolusing state) until stopped
by the Supervisor, while in the second mode the pump
can be bolusing for a fixed duration given by the value of
the bolus_time parameter. The pump transitions to the
bolusing state upon the signal received from the patient
only if it is in the running state; in all other states, the signal
is ignored. From either running or bolusing state, the
pump can move to a stopped state (Rstopped or Bstopped,
respectively) upon a signal from the network.
2) PO Automaton: The automaton, which represents the
pulse oximeter, is shown in Figure 10. The operation of the
automaton proceeds in rounds. Each round begins by setting
the window size for the round based on the last sampled value.
Then, the automaton collects the number of samples to fill the
SC
stop_clock <= OD_delay
CS
clear_clock <= OD_delay
S
stop_clock <= OD_delay
C
clear_clock <= OD_delay
E
drop
S2NW_stop ?
drop
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_stop!
clear_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_clear !
stop_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_stop!
clear_clock >= OD_delay
NW2PCA_clear !
S2NW_clear ?
clear_clock := 0
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock := 0
S2NW_stop ?
stop_clock := 0
S2NW_clear ?
clear_clock := 0
Fig. 9. Timed automaton for the network.
po_choice
pump_cleared
s_clock <= s_delay
pump_stopped
waiting_for_result
po_result >= spo2_threshold po_result < spo2_threshold
s_clock := 0
resultready?
local_spo2 := po_result
S2NW_clear ! CG2S_clear ?
s_clock >= s_delay
S2NW_stop!
Fig. 11. Timed automaton for the supervisor.
window. Samples are obtained periodically with the interval of
1 time unit, which corresponds to 100 ms. Finally, the result
is stored in the po_result variable and delivered to the
supervisor using the resultready channel.
3) Network and Caregiver Automata: The network is mod-
eled using two automata. Communication from the Supervisor
to the pump is modeled with automaton from Figure 9. The
automaton implements a two-place buffer, which means that
there may be two network messages in transit. The stop mes-
sage may be dropped by the network, if the boolean parameter
drop is set to true. We do not model dropping of the restart
message, since the loss of these messages does not affect
the safety of the patient. If messages are not dropped, they
are delivered by the network in order. A similar automaton
(not shown here) is used to introduce a bounded delay for
PO measurements (i.e., po_result). Again, messages can
be dropped if drop is set to true. The Caregiver automaton,
not shown here, contains one state and can send any of the
messages at any time. The messages include PCA pump and
Supervisor configuration commands (e.g., CG2PCA_start,
CG2S_clear). A more detailed model of the caregiver may
include data-dependent behaviors, for example, the clear signal
may be sent only if the SpO2 reading is high enough. However,
any other model will have fewer behaviors than the caregiver
model used here, and thus the safety property will still hold.
4) Supervisor Automaton: The Supervisor automaton,
shown in Figure 11, implements the simple control algorithm.
Upon receiving a SpO2 reading from the pulse oximeter, the
supervisor compares it with the pre-defined threshold value
and, if the result is too low, sends the stop message to the pump
across the network. The model also incorporates a delay, which
represents the worst-case execution time of the supervisor
algorithm. Then, once the caregiver resolves the problem, the
supervisor sends another message to restart the pump. For
simplicity of the presentation, the Supervisor automaton only
deals with SpO2, not heart rates.
5) Patient Automaton: The Patient automaton, shown in
Figure 12, periodically updates the drug level based on the
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lclock <= 1
s9
lclock <= 1
s2
lclock <= 1
s5
lclock <= 1
s7
lclock <= 1
setwindowsize
s8
lclock <= 1
s4
lclock <= 1
s1 lclock <=1
s3
lclock <= 1
s6
lclock <= 1
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
po_result < 85
i := 0 , windowsize := 4 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result < 90 and po_result > 84
i := 0 , windowsize := 6 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result < 94 and po_result > 89
i := 0 , windowsize := 7 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result < 97 and po_result > 93
i := 0 , windowsize := 8 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
po_result > 96
i := 0 , windowsize := 10 , lclock := 0 , sum := 0
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1  and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1  and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
i > windowsize
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
lclock >= 1 and i <= windowsize
sampleready?
sum := sum + samplebuffer , i := i + 1 , lclock := 0
1 == 1
resultready!
po_result := sum / i
Fig. 10. Timed automaton for the pulse oximeter.
flow rate of the pump and drug absorption rate. In addition, at
any time, the model can deliver a sample as the function of the
current drug level. The designed model implements a linear
patient dynamics, which does not match the more realistic
Simulink model. An important question that needs to be
addressed is the consistency between the two models. Since the
UPPAAL model of the controller uses significantly simplified
patient dynamics, there is the possibility that verification
results obtained on the UPPAAL model would not apply to
the more detailed model and thus the system itself. Therefore,
in the remaining of this subsection we address initialization of
the Patient’s and PCA pump automata.
6) Initializing model parameters: To determine values for
the parameters of Patient and PCA pump automata we consider
the Patient’s behavior with respect to the safety requirements.
From safety conditions from Section III it follows that the
focus of interest for the safety analysis is with the Patient’s
behavior in the Alarming region. For both Supervisor designs
it is required that the minimal time that the Patient can spend
in the region is bounded by t˜crit (from (12)). Therefore, the
value of t˜crit, the minimal time it takes for the patient to be
overdosed, is an important consistency check for the models.
In UPPAAL, the value for tcrit may be different (we denote
start
p_clock <= 1
sampleready !
samplebuffer := 100 - drug_level
drug_level < pain_thresh
P2PCA_bolus !
drug_level := drug_level +pca_rate >= ab_rate ?
        drug_level + pca_rate - ab_rate : 0,
p_clock := 0
drug_level >= pain_thresh
drug_level := drug_level 
                + pca_rate - ab_rate,
p_clock := 0
p_clock >= 1
Fig. 12. Timed automaton for the patient.
it astUcrit), and can be obtained from the Patient model as:
tUcrit =
⌈
∆HSpO2/SpO2gain
PCA rateON − ab rate
⌉
, (14)
where PCA rateON = default bolus rate +
default rate and dxe denotes the smallest integer
greater than or equal to x. To guarantee consistency
between the UPPAAL and Simulink models, the value for
tUcrit has to be no greater than the previously obtained
value t˜crit. Consequently, from condition tUcrit ≤ t˜crit
and (14) we can derive the UPPAAL model parameters
(default bolus rate and default rate from the PCA
automaton and ab rate from the Patient automaton).
In our case, tUcrit turns out to be 20 seconds for the initial
values of the parameters that describe the patient dynamics
and drug flow (pca rate = 3, ab rate = 2), which is an
order of magnitude smaller than t˜crit. Clearly, the UPPAAL
model overestimates the rate of change for the drug level in
the patient’s body. And, since the system has been proven
safe in this case, it would also be safe in a more realistic
case. However, since we want to more realistically mimic the
patient’s behavior in the Alarming region it is necessary to set
the parameters in a way that:⌈
∆HSpO2/SpO2gain
PCA rateON − ab rate
⌉
=
⌊
t˜crit
⌋
(15)
This also allows for relaxation of timing requirements imposed
on other components in the control loop. For example, with
this value it is possible to relax the bound on the network
imposed delay (tnet) from Table I.
Furthermore, it is necessary to achieve consistency between
the UPPAAL and physical patient models in cases when the
pump is turned off. Here, the goal is to minimize the difference
between the times (obtained from UPPAAL and Simulink
models) that the patient would spend in the Alarming zone if
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the pump is turned off at the boundary of the Critical zone. As
in the previous case, the condition that relates UPPAAL model
parameters with the patient model from (1) can be obtained
from (12) where ui = 0 (i.e., drug delivery is turned of) and
rate down = ab rate− default bolus rate:⌈
∆HSpO2/SpO2gain
rate down
⌉
=
⌊
1
||A˜|| ln
( |∆HSpO2 |/SpO2gain
||C˜|| · ||x˜0||
+ 1
)⌋
(16)
From (15) and (16) the parameters for PCA and Patient
automata can be derived.
B. Verifying Safety Properties of the System
The main safety property that needs to be verified on the
UPPAAL model is whether or not the patient can enter the
Critical region, where SpO2 and heart rate are low enough to
indicate a respiratory arrest. Before verifying safety, however,
we perform several auxiliary checks to ensure model sanity.
We express properties we verify in the subset of the Com-
putational Tree Logic (CTL) [19] used by UPPAAL. The main
temporal operators of this logic that we use are Aφ, which
means that φ is satisfied in every state along every execution
path from the current state, and A♦φ, meaning that φ is
satisfied eventually along every path.
The first sanity check is the absence of deadlocks in the
model. Another sanity check is that once the SpO2 level goes
below the pain threshold, it eventually goes up. This property
is captured by the temporal logic formula
A(samplebuffer < pain thresh⇒
A♦samplebuffer ≥ pain thresh). (17)
Note that the property is defined in terms of the true SpO2
level as defined by the patient model, not the sensor reading
obtained by the supervisor. Intuitively, this property should
hold, because the normal infusion rate is lower than the drug
absorption rate. Once the patient stops requesting new boluses
and the last bolus infusion is over, the drug level will start
decreasing and thus SpO2 and heart rate levels should increase,
until they reach pain threshold again. We also check that the
pump is stopped if the patient ever enters the Alarming region:
A(samplebuffer < alarm thresh⇒
A♦(PCA.Rstopped ∨ PCA.Bstopped)). (18)
We consider this property to be a sanity check rather than a
safety requirement, because wrong parameters of the model
– for example, too short bolus duration or too high drug
absorption rate – can make the system appear safe (that is,
SpO2 level never goes too low), but it would be safe for
the wrong reason. All sanity checks were passed by the
UPPAAL model described above when no dropped messages
are allowed. Clearly, property (18) does not hold if messages
can be dropped.
Finally, we turn to checking the main safety property. With
the threshold for the Critical region set to 70%, the property
A(samplebuffer ≥ critical) is satisfied if the stop message
cannot be dropped. However, if losing messages is enabled in
the network automaton, the property is not satisfied.
V. FAILURES AND FAIL-SAFE PCA SYSTEM
We have seen in Section IV that the system does not satisfy
its safety property if network messages can be lost. Also, if
any of the delays on the left side of the safety condition (4)
is significantly increased, the condition would not be satisfied.
Increase in delays can be caused by a component or network
failure, effectively resulting in an open-loop system.
To provide safety assurance, realistic scenarios have to be
taken into account, where network failures occur or PO acci-
dentally gets detached from the patient. Thus, the Supervisor’s
control algorithm and PCA pump’s designs have to guarantee
the system’s open-loop safety. For the case study, this denotes
that even if the Supervisor does not receive the right values for
HR and/or SpO2, or the pump does not receive the command to
disable the drug flow, the system design has to ensure that the
patient would not enter the Critical region. In addition, open-
loop safety implies that even if the patient keeps pressing the
button, no drug flow would be enabled if there is a chance
that the amount of infused drug could harm the patient.
One way to design the system that complies with the open-
loop safety requirement is to make changes in the closed-
loop system from Figure 2. In the modified system, the pump
only receives activation commands from the Supervisor (not
the Patient), along with the duration of the drug flow (which
does not have to be fixed). When the Patient presses the
button, if the Supervisor is informed about the current HR
and SpO2 levels it is able to determine a duration of the
pump’s activation (∆tsafe) that guarantees the patient’s safety.
Additional condition is that the Supervisor disregards if the
button is pressed during tdel units of time after the pump has
stopped, where tdel accounts for all the delays in the loop:
tdel = tPOdel + tnet + tSup + tnet + tPump + tPCA2P
The imposed condition ensures that the last drug delivery has
taken full effect before the next ‘button pressed’ command
is sent to the Supervisor. It implies that the drug level will
reach its local maximum (i.e., HR and SpO2 level will reach
local minima) before HR and SpO2 measurements sent to
the Supervisor are obtained. All constituents of tdel, except
the network delay, can be calculated as previously described.
However, we assume that if the message is delivered, the
underlying real-time network provides a guaranteed bound on
the network delay, as described in [7].
To calculate ∆tsafe the following parameters are used:
• hcur - last received SpO2 level;
• h′cur - the actual SpO2 when the drug reaches the body;
• ∆h(h0,∆t) - the maximal SpO2 decrease caused by the
drug flow of duration ∆t, if the initial SpO2 level is h0.
Now, the safety requirement can be specified as:
h′cur −∆h(h′cur,∆tsafe) ≥ HSpO22 . (19)
It is worth noting that although we use SpO2 measure-
ments to calculate ∆tsafe, it is also possible to use HR
measurements, because the Critical region boundary (i.e.,
HHR2 instead of H
SpO2
2 ) corresponds to the same drug level.
The requirement that after the pump has been stopped the
Supervisor would disregard if the button is pressed for tdel
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS 11
time units, implies that h′cur ≥ hcur when the button pressed
command is accepted (since SpO2 levels increase when the
drug level decreases due to the fact that the pump is turned
off). Thus, (19) is satisfied when the condition below is valid:
∆h(h′cur,∆tsafe) ≤ hcur −HSpO22 . (20)
To determine ∆tsafe Theorem 1 can be utilized. In this
case, the safety condition (19) is satisfied if:
∆tsafe ≤ t˜safe = 1||A˜|| ln
 |HSpO22 − hcur|/SpO2gain
||C˜|| ·
(
||x˜0||+ ||B˜ui||||Amin||
) + 1

(21)
Obviously if hcur > H
SpO2
1 (H
SpO2
1 is the SpO2 threshold value
for the Alarming region) ∆tsafe would be greater than t˜crit.
Similarly, if the patient is already in the Alarming region
(hcur ≤ HSpO21 ) then ∆tsafe ≤ t˜crit.
The system guarantees open-loop safety since, even if some
(or all) of the messages are dropped, the patient would never
enter the Critical region. The reason is that the pump activation
command also contains the duration of the drug flow; if the
flow durations are properly computed, the pump stops before
the safety requirement is breached.
To guarantee open-loop safety an assumption was made that
the Supervisor is able to determine whether received mea-
surements are valid. This is a reasonable assumption because
modern POs send an invalid code when valid measurements
can not be obtained.4 Note that in this work we do not consider
failures where each component’s behavior differs from the
behavior described by its model. For example, if the pump
is active longer than requested, or if the PO does not send an
invalid code when it is unable to obtain valid measurements.
The presented solution is not the only way to guarantee
open-loop safety. An alternative approach, which requires a
minimal change to existing PCA infusion pumps, is to have
the Supervisor instruct the pump with the maximal amount of
drugs that can be delivered. Using a procedure similar to (21)
the Supervisor can easily derive the maximal allowed drug
dosage. This system is also inherently fail-safe since, as in
the previous case, the worst consequence of failed network,
Supervisor, or PO is no drug infusion.
VI. RELATED WORK
Formal methods have traditionally been used for verification
of time-critical and safety-critical embedded systems [20]. For
example, model-driven techniques were used for validation
(e.g., [21]) and verification (e.g., [22], [23], [24]) of industrial
control systems, but their use for medical device certification is
quite recent. In this domain, formal techniques have been ap-
plied to improve medical device protocols [25] and safety [26].
In addition, in [10] the authors present the use of Extended
Finite State Machines for model checking of the Computer
Automated Resuscitation A medical device, while in [27] a
model-driven development of cardiac pacemakers is described.
Nonetheless, although these papers consider relevant clinical
4Detachment of the probes from the patient’s body or movements of the
patient’s hand are the main reasons why POs do not obtain valid values.
applications, in all of them either a simplified patient model
was utilized or the patient was not modeled at all.
Continuous monitoring of the blood oxygenation of patients
receiving PCA infusions has been done in the past and even
commercially implemented. The Alaris 8210 SpO2 Module
connects to the Alaris 8000 pump controller and adds the
ability to pause infusions based on a target SpO2. Our ap-
proach shows how a similar system could be designed and
validated. In particular, while the available commercial system
is provided as a tightly-integrated system from a single vendor,
our approach could be used to design and validate systems
based on devices from multiple sources as long as the timing
and other necessary information is available.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have presented a clinically relevant case study of the
closed-loop control of a PCA infusion pump. To perform
safety analysis of the closed-loop medical system we have
used a model-driven approach that combines simulation-based
validation of a continuous-time system model in Simulink
with formal verification of a more abstract model using timed
automata and the UPPAAL tool. The key to keeping the two
models consistent has been the derivation of timing parameters
of the system from the Simulink model and the use of these
constants in the UPPAAL model.
For the case study, we have shown that the system is safe
under no failure assumptions. We have identified how to deal
with some of the failures that manifest as unbounded delays.
The proposed method is based on the well-known notion
of timed lease used in fault-tolerant distributed systems. We
believe that such a technique can be applied to other tightly
integrated medical systems in which fail safe is essential.
The dynamics in the considered case study is relatively
simple. This choice is made on purpose, to better present
the steps in our approach, including the analysis of a system
with uncertain parameters. Given the simple case study, we
believe that our approach allows us to construct safety cases
for regulatory approval of closed-loop medical systems. With
more complicated dynamics, some of the steps become more
difficult; in particular, the derivation of timing parameters for
patient models with uncertain parameters could require more
sophisticated methods and further research may be required.
In this paper, we highlight the need for model-driven safety
analysis of the closed-loop medical systems and, on a specific
case study, we emphasize potential problems that might occur.
However, it it will be of interest to extend our approach to
more general closed-loop medical scenarios.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: Consider the LTI system from (7). The system
state at time t0 + t for all t ≥ 0 can be computed as ([28]):
x(t+ t0) = e
Atx0 +
∫ t0+t
t0
eA(t+t0−τ)Bu(τ)dτ.
Therefore, if u(t) = ui for all t ≥ t0, where ui is a constant
vector, the system evolution can be described as:
x(t+ t0)− x0 = (eAt − In)x0 +A−1(eAt − In)Bui (22)
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where In ∈ Rn×n is n × n identity matrix. Due to the fact
that for matrices P, P1 and Q of the appropriate dimensions
||PQ|| ≤ ||P || · ||Q|| and ||P +Q|| ≤ ||P ||+ ||Q||, from (22)
it is possible to provide the following bound:
|y(t+ t0)− y(t0)| = |C(x(t+ t0)− x0)|
≤ ||C||||x(t+ t0)− x0|| (23)
Now, consider the term ||eAt− In||. From the definition of
the exponential function we can obtain:
||eAt − In|| = ||
∞∑
k=0
(At)k
k!
− In|| = ||
∞∑
k=1
(At)k
k!
||
≤
∞∑
k=1
(||A||t)k
k!
=
∞∑
k=0
(||A||t)k
k!
− 1 = e||A||t − 1
(24)
Similarly, it can be shown:
||A−1(eAt − In)|| ≤ ||A||−1(e||A||t − 1) (25)
From (23)-(25) it is possible to obtain a bound on the change
in the system’s output:
|y(t+ t0)− y(t0)| ≤ ||C||(e||A||t − 1)(||x0||+ ||A||−1||Bui||)
Therefore, from the previous equation:
t ≥ 1||A|| ln
( |y(t0 + t)− y(t0)|
||C|| · (||x0||+ ||Bui||||A||−1) + 1
)
(26)
for all matrices A, B and C that belong to the polyhedrons
<{A}, <{B} and <{C}, respectively.
Eq. (26) provides a lower bound on the value t for which the
system output can progress from point y(t0) to the point y(t0+
t) for any values of the aforementioned matrices. The bound
is a function of the patient parameters (i.e., matrices A, B
and C). The goal is to provide the bound value that is the
minimum of the term on the right side of (26) for all matrices
A, B and C belonging to the corresponding polyhedrons.
The term on the right side of (26) decreases as the values
||A||, ||C||, ||x0|| , ||A||−1 and ||Bui|| increase. Note that
it is not possible to calculate the value for ||A|| that will
minimize the term. Thus, for simplicity we consider two
independent problems:
max
A∈<{A}
||A|| and max
A∈<{A}
||A||−1
As maxA∈<{A} ||A||−1 = 1minA∈<{A} ||A|| , by defining A˜, B˜,
C˜ as in the Theorem statement, (8) can be obtained.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: Assume that there exist a non-vertex matrix
A˜0 = argmaxA∈<{A} ||A||, and that there does not exist a
vertex matrix A ∈ <{A} such that ||A|| = ||A˜0||. Since A˜0
is not a vertex of the bounded polyhedron <{A}, there exists
matrix element a˜ij such that: aˆij −∆aij < a˜ij < aˆij + ∆aij .
Consider  = min(a˜ij−(aˆij−∆aij), aˆij+∆aij− a˜ij). Since
A˜0 is not a vertex, then  > 0. We denote by AˆL1 and Aˆ
H
1
the matrices whose all elements are equal to the appropriate
elements of A˜0, except the elements from ith row and jth
column that are aˆLij = a˜ij −  and aˆHij = a˜ij + . Thus, either
aˆLij = aˆij −∆aij , in which case we define a new matrix A˜1
as A˜1 = AˆL1 , or aˆ
H
ij = aˆij + ∆aij and we define A˜1 = Aˆ
H
1 .
Since A˜0 maximizes the norm then ||A˜0|| ≥ ||AˆL1 || and
||A˜0|| ≥ ||AˆH1 ||. If any of ||AˆL1 ||, ||AˆH1 || is strictly less than
||A˜0|| then:
||A˜|| > 1
2
(
||AˆL||+ ||AˆH ||
)
(27)
On the other hand, since ||A|| is a convex function and A˜0 =
1
2 (Aˆ
L
1 + Aˆ
H
1 ) it follows that: ||A˜0|| ≤ 12
(
||AˆL1 ||+ ||AˆH1 ||
)
,
contradicting (27). Thus, ||A˜0|| = ||AˆL1 || = ||AˆH1 || = ||A˜1||.
By repeating the above procedure, we either obtain a
contradiction or an array of matrices A˜0, A˜1, ..., A˜k that are
solutions to the norm maximization problem. However, since
at each iteration we set one of the matrix elements to be on
its region boundary, the array can have at most N elements
(i.e., k ≤ N ), where N denotes the number of elements of
matrices A ∈ <{A}. Furthermore, the final matrix A˜k is a
vertex of the polyhedron <{A} which is in contradiction with
the initial assumption, implying that there exist an optimal
solution Amax that is a vertex of the polyhedron <{A}.
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